We combine forward investment performance processes and ambiguity averse portfolio selection. We introduce robust forward criteria which address ambiguity in specification of the model, the risk preferences and the investment horizon. They encode the evolution of dynamically consistent ambiguity averse preferences.
associated withλ. The leverage is proportional to the investor's confidence in her estimateλ.
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Introduction
This paper is a contribution to optimal investment as a problem of normative decisions under uncertainty. This topic is central to financial economics and mathematical finance, and the relevant body of research is large and diverse. Within it, the expected utility maximisation (EUM), with its axiomatic foundation going back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [68] and Savage [60] , is probably the most widely used and extensively studied framework. In a continuous time setting, it was first applied to the optimal portfolio selection by Merton [48] who proposed a stochastic optimization problem of the form
where P is the historical probability measure, T the trading horizon and U (·) the investor's utility at T . Despite the popularity of the above model, there has been a considerable amount of criticism of the model fundamentals (P, T, U ), for these inputs might be ambiguous, inflexible, not very amenable to applications and difficult to specify. First, there are numerous issues regarding elucidation and choice of the utility function U . Some authors argue that the concept of utility per se is elusive and one should look for different, more pragmatic criteria to use in order to quantify the risk preferences of the investor. We refer the reader to an old note of F. Black [9] where the criterion is the choice of the optimal portfolio, see also He and Huang [29] and Cox, Hobson and Ob lój [14] , and to Sharpe [66] and Monin [49] where the criterion is a targeted wealth distribution. Another line of research accepts the utility as an appropriate device to rank outcomes but challenges the classical EUM, for empirical evidence shows that investors feel differently with respect to gains and losses. Among others, see Hershey and Schoemaker [33] and Kahneman and Tversky [35] which then led to the development of the area of behavioural finance (see e.g. Barberis [5] and Jin and Zhou [34] ). A third line generalises the concept of utility and moves away from a terminal-horizon deterministic utility, as U (·) above, by allowing stateand path-dependence which can alleviate several drawbacks of the classical setting. One of the best known paradigms are the recursive utilities, see e.g. Duffie [19] , El Kaouri et al. [23] , Skiadas [67] . State-dependent utilities have also been considered in static frameworks, see e.g. Drèze [18] , Karni [40] .
Second, the investment horizon T might not be fixed and/or a priori known. Such situations arise, for example, in investment problems with rolling horizons or problems in which the horizon needs to be modified due to inflow of new funds, new market opportunities, or new investment options and obligations. In this context it is natural to study under which model conditions and preference structure one could extend the standard investment problem beyond a prespecified horizon in a time consistent manner, see e.g. Källblad [36] . It is also interesting to study utilities that are not biased by the horizon choice, as the horizon-unbiased utilities introduced by Henderson and Hobson [30] ; see also Choulli et al. [13] .
Last but not least, an investor frequently faces a significant ambiguity as to which market model to use, specifically, how to determine the probability measure P. This is often referred to as the Knightian uncertainty, in reference to the original contribution of Knight [43] . Weakening of the independence axiom to account for the ambiguity aversion, motivated by the Ellsberg [24] paradox, led to the generalised robust EUM paradigm in Gilboa and Schmeidler [28] . It built on earlier contributions, including Anscombe and Aumann [2] and Schmeidler [65] , and has since been followed and extended by a large number of works; we refer the reader to Maccheroni et al. [46] , Schied [62] and to Föllmer, Schied and Weber [26] , and the references therein, for an overview.
Our work herein was motivated by the above considerations of the triplet of model inputs (P, T, U ). We propose a framework that alleviates some of the above shortcomings in a unified manner, combining elements from the classical robustness theory and the recently developed forward investment performance approach. We now briefly introduce the latter before describing our main contributions.
In the absence of model uncertainty, Musiela and Zariphopoulou [52, 53] introduced the forward performance process as an adapted stochastic criterion parametrized by wealth and time, denoted by U (x, t), t ≥ 0, and constructed "forward-in-time". Specifically, given today's profile U (x, t), the forward process for an arbitrary upcoming investment period T > t, U (x, T ) , is specified so that U (x, t) ≥ E P [ U (X π T , T )| F t , X t = x] for any admissible π, and U (x, t) = E P [U (X π * T , T )|F t , X t = x] for the optimal π * .
This allows considerable flexibility in incorporating changing market opportunities and investors' attitudes in a dynamically-consistent manner. In contrast, in the classical formulation, the value function is constructed in a similar manner but in the opposite time direction: the utility criterion is first chosen at the end of the horizon and then the Dynamic Programming Principle generates the solution from T to previous times. The computation of the value function involves the underlying model for market dynamics for the entire investment horizon and there is no a priori mechanism to extend the investment problem beyond T in a dynamically-consistent manner. This induces significant limitations, as discussed below in our motivating example in Section 2.1.
In this paper we build an analogous decision framework for an agent who faces model ambiguity. As in the classical robust EUM, we consider an investor in a stochastic market environment for which she does not know the "true" model. Instead, she describes the market reality through relative weighting of stochastic models with some models being more likely than others, some being excluded all together, etc. These views are expressed by a penalty function and are updated dynamically in time. The investor's personal evaluation of wealth is expressed through her preferences. When considering a given investment horizon, say T , the investor aims to maximise the robust expected utility (max-min) functional, similarly to Maccheroni et al. [46] and Schied [62] . However, we generalise their criterion by considering stochastic preferences. These preferences evolve forward in time, taking into account the model ambiguity, and are defined for all investment horizons. Accordingly, we call them robust forward criteria. They are encoded by pairs of utility fields and penalty functions which are dynamically consistent.
Our theoretical focus is on defining and further characterising the new investment criteria. We consider their duals and establish an appropriate duality result. Similarly to Schied [62] , as well as Quenez [59] and Schied and Wu [63] , the duality proof proceeds by using an appropriate min-max theorem and then applying a model-specific duality result to the inner maximizaiton. However, unlike [62] which relied on results of Kramkov and Schachermayer [44] , we view the inner maximization problems under the fixed reference measure P but featuring stochastic utility functions and apply the duality inŽitković [69] . Our proofs involve a number of technical and conceptual novelties. We prove relevant conjugacy relations and the existence of a dual optimizer for a class of utility functions which are allowed to be stochastic and finite on the entire real line. This means that the dynamic consistency conditions are imposed jointly on the penalty function and the utility random field. Unlike for convex risk measures or the classical EUM, the dynamic aspects of robust portfolio optimization seem to have been studied only for specific examples, see e.g. Laeven and Stadje [45] , Müller [50] . We provide general results which, in particular, highlight the necessity of a conditional stability property of the penalty functions, see (iv) in Definition 2.4, in the past only considered for dynamic risk measures. Further, we also obtain the equivalence between dynamic consistency in the primal and dual domain and characterize the latter via a suitable submartingale property. While these are natural properties which are well understood in other contexts, e.g. classical EUM, they appear to be novel in the context of robust portfolio optimization. We use the dual formulation to study the question of time consistency of the optimal strategies. We show that in general, both in our framework as well as in the classical robust EUM, the optimal strategies may fail to be time consistent. This is caused by possibly arbitrary dynamics of the penalty functions. We show that time consistency of the optimal strategies is guaranteed under suitable assumptions of dynamic consistency of the penalty functions.
Apart from the theoretical contribution, we also construct and solve explicitly a practically relevant example which showcases the advantages of our approach. We consider an investor who starts with a logarithmic utility and applies a quadratic penalty function. Specifically, the investor builds a dynamic estimate of the market price of risk, sayλ, and updates her stochastic utility in accordance with the so-perceived elapsed market opportunities. We show that this leads to a time consistent optimal investment policy given by a fractional Kelly strategy associated withλ. The leverage is a function of the investor's confidence in the estimateλ. This solution is both intuitive and relevant since it corresponds to strategies often followed by large investors in practice. In the classical robust EUM approach, for a fixed time horizon [0, T ], such behaviour is consistent with the simplest setting of a complete market and constant penalty weighting and is essentially the only explicit example available in the classical approach, see Hernández-Hernández and Schied [32] . In a more complex setting -e.g. of incomplete market and/or general adapted penalty weight -this structure is lost, the solution is described with PDE or BSDE methods and the optimal investment strategies may depend on the setting and on the investment horizon T . This complexity is due to an entangled nature of solving the problem backwards and having a deterministic boundary constraint at T . Our approach, in contrast, does not suffer from such drawbacks and offers a solution which holds in great generality. We discuss this in detail in Section 2.1. A further example of an investor initially endowed with an exponential utility is studied in Section 2.2.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the market model is specified, the robust forward criteria are introduced and the motivating examples are studied. In Section 3, equivalent dual characterizations of robust forward criteria are established. Then, in Section 4, we study the link between dynamic consistency of penalty functions and time consistency of optimal investment strategies. In particular, we discuss a simple example of criteria leading to time inconsistent optimal investment strategies. Section 5 is devoted to a, mostly formal, discussion of various classes of criteria. Our aim is to illustrate the flexibility of the notion and the fact that interesting preferences might be identified under additional evolutionary requirements. In particular, time-monotone criteria are linked to a specific PDE. We also argue that for each robust forward criterion, there exists a specific (standard) forward criterion in the reference market producing the same optimal behaviour. The proofs are deferred to Section 6.
Robust forward criteria: motivation and definition
In order to motivate and illustrate the upcoming definition, we first consider two examples. First, in Section 2.1, we build a robust forward criterion which combines logarithmic preferences with a quadratic penalty structure for model ambiguity. The example is of particular interest as it gives theoretical justification for fractional Kelly strategies often used in practice. Subsequently, in Section 2.2, we consider an example with initial exponential preferences. Finally, in Section 2.3, we introduce the general setup and definition.
A motivating example: robust forward criteria yielding fractional Kelly strategies
Consider a probability space (Ω, F, (F t ), P) with the filtration spanned by a two-dimensional P-Brownian motionŴ t = (Ŵ 1 t ,Ŵ 2 t ), t ≥ 0, and a market with a zero-interest bond and a stock whose price (S t ) t≥0 solves
for some F-progressively measurable processesλ t and σ t > 0, t ≥ 0. An investor acting in this incomplete market chooses the number of shares, denoted (π t ) t≥0 , to buy of the risky asset. Her wealth process then follows the dynamics
The set of admissible strategies is defined as A := π : (π t ) adapted, (X π t ) well-defined and X π t > 0 a.s. for all t > 0 , and we also write A x when we want to stress the dependence on the initial wealth X 0 = x. We denote by A x t the analogous set of strategies on [t, ∞) starting from X π t = x. Before we introduce model uncertainty, let us discuss this simple setup to highlight the differences between the classical problem (1.1) and the forward performance criteria. An investor solving (1.1) with a time horizon T and utility function U (x) = ln x is myopic and simply follows the growth optimal, or the Kelly [41] , strategy which investsλ t /σ t fraction of wealth in the risky asset, π * t =λ t σtSt X π * t , see Bansal and Lehmann [4] and Kardaras et al. [39] and the references therein for details. While π * does not rely on T , nor on the particular dynamics ofλ in the future, the value function of the investor with wealth x at time t very much does and is given by
In contrast, the analogous time-monotone forward performance process, which generates the same optimal investment strategy, is given by
which puts value in the context of the elapsed market opportunities instead. This allows considerable flexibility in reassessing upcoming market evolution, in a dynamically-consistent manner. Crucially, as we show below, this setup behaves much more naturally when model uncertainty is introduced. Suppose now that the investor acknowledges model ambiguity. She builds, and updates dynamically, her best estimate of reality P (or equivalentlyλ) but she is aware that it might be inaccurate. So the investor considers various other models and quantifies their relative likelihood via a penalty function γ. Specifically, when making decisions over the interval [t, T ], we only consider measures Q ∼ P on F T . We denote by P the set of all F-progressively measurable processes (ν t ) t≥0 such that T 0 (ν t ) 2 dt < ∞ a.s. for all T > 0. Any measure Q ∼ P on F T may then be identified with a process η = (η 1 , η 2 ) ∈ P × P, for which dQ d P | F T = D η T , where the martingale (D η t ) t≥0 is given by
We write Q = Q η and, for the present example, assign it the penalty
for some adapted, non-negative process (δ t ) which controls the strength of the penalisation (cf. also (5.3) below), i.e. (δ t ) quantifies 1 the investor's trust in the estimate P. Note that it is natural to expect γ t,T (·)(ω) to have a global minimum at P |F T . We let Q t,T denote the set of Q η with a.s. finite penalty at time t. Finally, we assume that there exists κ > 1/2 such that E exp κ T 0λ 2 s ds < ∞ for all T > 0. This is a convenient integrability assumption which can be interpreted as P being reasonable. We then have the following result, the proof of which is reported in Section 6.
Proposition 2.1 Given the investor's choice of (λ t ) and (δ t ) as above, let
4)
and
(2.5)
Recall that the penalty γ is given by (2.3). Then, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞,
6)
and the optimum is attained for the saddle point (η,π) given in (2.4). 1 For δt ≡ δ constant, the penalty function in (2.3) corresponds to the entropic penalty γ(Q) = δH(Q| P), which allows to reformulate the optimization problem in (2.6) as a pure maximization problem with a modified utility function (if considering utility from intertemporal consumption such penalty functions still yield non-trivial problems; see among others [10, 67] ). For δt a general process, the situation is however different.
The investment strategy given in (2.4) corresponds to strategies used in practice by some of the large fund managers. Specifically, it is a fractional Kelly strategy, where the investor invests in the growth optimal (Kelly) portfolio corresponding to her best estimate of the market price of riskλ. However she is not fully invested but instead chooses a leverage 2 proportional to her trust in the estimateλ. If δ t ∞ (infinite trust in the estimation), then π t S t /Xπ t λ t /σ t which is the Kelly strategy associated with the most likely model P. On the other hand, if δ t 0 (no trust in the estimation), then π t 0 and the optimal behaviour is to invest nothing. We stress thatλ and δ are the investor's arbitrary inputs. In particular, there is no assumption that λ is a good estimate of some "true" market price of risk λ. For the dynamic consistency (2.6), it is only crucial that the investor's utility function (2.5) evolves in function of the investor's perception of market.
The above solution is intuitive, practically relevant, and robust. It is very insightful to compare it with the classical robust EUM framework. The latter would fix an investment horizon T and take U (x, T ) = ln x with (2.6) defining the value field for t ≤ T . For some simple setups, e.g. a complete market with δ s ≡ δ, this would lead to the same optimal investment strategyπ in (2.4), cf. Hernández-Hernández and Schied [32] . However in more general setups, the optimal strategy would not be explicit, would depend on T and on the set of measures Q t,T in a complex way, see e.g. [32, 45, 50] . The robust EUM entangles model ambiguity with horizon specification in a rather complex way leading to loss of the intuitive structure of the solution. There are further important advantages of our approach. The classical robust EUM would result in a value function which is defined on [0, T ] and has a non-trivial volatility while (2.5) is defined for all time horizons simultaneously and is monotone in time; see Section 5 for a further discussion of such structural properties.
We believe that the above example showcases the advantages of our approach over the classical robust EUM. Our idea behind the robust forward criteria, which we introduce formally below, is to take the condition of dynamic consistency (2.6) as the defining property, and study the corresponding class of investment criteria. Specifically, we say that a pair of mappings, namely a utility (random) field U : Ω × [0, ∞) × R → R and a penalty function γ : {Q ∼ P} → R, is a robust forward criterion if they satisfy this property for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞; see Definition 2.5. With this terminology, the pair (U, γ) defined in Proposition 2.1 is a robust forward criterion for which the fractional Kelly strategy is optimal. This class of preferences provides dynamically consistent investment criteria which are well-defined for all investment horizons.
Second example: robust forward criteria for wealth on R
In our motivating example studied above, wealth was assumed to be positive. We now present a second explicit example where wealth is allowed to become negative, which will be the setup of our abstract definitions in Section 2.3. The example starts with well-studied and canonical choices in economics: preferences which exhibit a constant absolute risk aversion and a multiple-prior (coherent) penalty first derived via an axiomatic approach to preferences by Gilboa and Schmeidler [28] . The underlying setup is the same as in the previous example with the investor's best estimate of the market denoted byP under which the underlying (incomplete) market is specified via (2.1) and we assume that E exp 2 u 0λ 2 s ds < ∞ for all u > 0. Investor's trust in her current estimation is now described through a predictable process α with 0 ≤ α t ≤λ t . The investor considers all models for which the market price of risk is at most α away from the current best estimateλ, i.e. for an investment horizon [t, T ], the investor considers the following set of models:
where for simplicity 3 we assume that the investor is confident about her modelling of the market factor W 2 t . In practice,λ t is likely to be estimated using statical methods and we may think of α t as the width of the confidence interval. We consider a coherent penalty function (γ t,T ) 0≤t≤T , assigning the penalty
In Section 3, when proving general duality results, we will not investigate existence of an optimal strategy and hence will restrict to bounded wealth processes. Here we require a larger class of admissible strategies:
A := π : (π t ) is predictable with (X π t ) well-defined, for t ≥ 0;
The latter part of the above definition imposes an integrability condition in each market model the investor considers plausible. The parameter a is used to model the investors risk aversion; notably, the more risk-averse the investor is, the smaller her set of available trading strategies 4 .
The following result is proved in Section 6:
Proposition 2.2 Consider investor's choice of (λ t ) and (α t ) and assume that 0 ≤ α t ≤λ t , for t ≥ 0. Recall that the penalty γ is of entropic type with Q t,T given by (2.7) and let
Then, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞,
10)
and the optimum is attained for the saddle point (η,π) given in (2.8).
Equation (2.10) is a dynamic consistency relation which, as argued above, will be the defining property for our robust decision criteria. Indeed, the pair (U, γ) is a robust forward criterion as defined below in Definition 2.5. The choice of a penalty of multiple-priors type means that all measures are considered equally likely and in consequence the strategy is adjusted to the worstcase scenario. Specifically, the investor invests an amount proportional to the sharpe ratio in the worst market model among the ones he considers plausible, with the proportion depending on his risk aversion: the higher the risk aversion, the less the amount invested. Similar results were obtained in the case of a complete market setup in [64] . Robust EUM with exponential utilities and multiple-priors preferences have also been studied by use of stochastic control methods in [45] , [50] and [57] . In contrast to the these studies, and in analogy to the logarithmic example in Section 2.1, in our setup the natural behaviour in [64] extends to more general markets. As before, this is possible since we disentangle the ambiguity of model selection from the horizon specification which is impossible if the preferences are forced to be of a pre-specified deterministic form at some future date.
Definition of the robust forward performance criteria
We turn to our general market model and define the robust forward criteria.
The market model and notation
The market consists of d + 1 securities whose prices (S 0 t ; S t ) = (S 0 t , S 1 t , ..., S d t ), t ≥ 0, are modeled as a (d+1)-dimensional càdlàg semi-martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, P), where the filtration F = (F t ) t∈[0,∞) satisfies the usual conditions. We let S 0 ≡ 1 and assume S to be locally bounded. A portfolio process π = (π t ) t∈[0,∞) is an F-predictable process which is Sintegrable on [0, T ], for each T > 0, and denotes the number of shares held in the risky asset. The associated wealth process X π is given by
The set of admissible portfolio processes available to the investor is denoted by A and is typically a subset of all portfolio processes.
For each T > 0, M e T denotes the set of equivalent local martingale measures. That is, the set of measures Q on F T such that Q ∼ P |F T and each component of S is a Q-local martingale. Similarly, M a T denotes the set of absolutely continuous local martingale measures. The corresponding sets of density processes are denoted, respectively, by Z e T and Z a T . Put differently,
and similarly for Z a T . We impose the following assumption. Assumption 1 The set M e T is non-empty for each T > 0. This assumption is referred to as the absence of arbitrage (NFLVR) on finite horizons; see Section 2 in [69] for further discussion. Note that while
there need not exist a set M e of probability measures equivalent to P such that M e T = {Q| F T : Q ∈ M e }, for all T > 0. As argued in [69] , the condition of NFLVR on finite horizons implies that, for each Q ∈ M e T , the density process
T ], might be extended to a strictly positive martingale (Z t ) t∈[0,∞) such that Z 0 = 1 and ZS is a local martingale. The set of all such processes Z will be denoted by Z e . In particular, NFLVR on finite horizons holds, if and only if, Z e is non-empty. If the condition of strict positivity is replaced by the one of non-negativity, the obtained family is denoted by Z a . For any Q P, we use the notation
Utility random fields and penalty funtions
The robust forward criteria, which we introduce below, combine two elements: a utility random field U (ω, x, t), t ≥ 0, and a family of penalty functions γ t,T (Q), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and T ≥ 0. The component U (ω, ·, t) models investor's preferences at time t and may depend on the past (ω s ) s≤t . The investor faces ambiguity about the "true model" for the dynamics of financial assets and forms a view about the relative plausibility of different probability measures. This is reflected in γ t,T (Q)(ω) which gives the weighting of measure Q on F T . In Section 2.1 we considered the case of U defined on R + . From now on, we focus on the case of U defined on R. This simplifies some aspects of the duality theory, as explained in Section 3 below. Alterations of our abstract definitions to the case of U on R + are immediate.
which is measurable with respect to the product of the optional σ-algebra on Ω × [0, ∞) and B R . A utility random field is a random field which satisfies the following conditions:
i) For all t ∈ [0, ∞), the mapping x → U (ω, x, t) is P-a.s. a strictly concave and strictly increasing C 1 (R)-function which satisfies the Inada conditions
In what follows, we suppress ω from the notation and simply write U (x, t).
Moreover, for a given utility random field U (x, t) and a set of admissible strategies A, we say that
Condition (iv) above simply says that if at time t an investor considering [t, T ] can not tell apart Q 1 from Q 2 then she assigns them the same penalty. To the best of our knowledge, such condition has not been invoked previously in the context of robust portfolio optimization but is required here since, unlike previous works, we consider a dynamic problem and prove conditional conjugacy relations. Analogous condition has appeared before in the context of dynamic risk measures, see Definition 3.11 of local property of a penalty function in Cheridito et al. [12] or pasting property in Lemma 3.3 in Klöppel and Schweizer [42] . Its importance here becomes apparent in the proof of Lemma 6.4.
In the above definition, Q t,T is the set of feasible measures considered at time t when investing over [t, T ]. It may depend on t and T but is non-random. Both larger and smaller sets could be used, e.g. the (random) set of measures
However, for many natural penalty functions, these different choices lead to the same value function. Finally, note that we do not impose any regularity or consistency assumptions on γ t,T (Q) in the time variables. These are not necessary for the abstract results in Section 3 and will be introduced later when they appear naturally, see Assumption 3.
Robust forward performance criteria
We are now ready to introduce the robust forward criteria. As highlighted above, these are pairs (U, γ) which exhibit a dynamic consistency akin to the dynamic programming principle.
Definition 2.5 Let U be a utility random field, A a set of admissible strategies and γ an admissible family of penalty functions. We say that
a.s.
(2.12)
We note that the above definition is well posed. Indeed, given the assumptions on U and γ, the conditional expectations in (2.12) are well-defined (extended-valued) random variables. Since all Q ∈ Q t,T are equivalent to P, for each π ∈ A, the essential infimum is also well-defined (extended-valued) with respect to the reference measure P. The set of admissible strategies A which we consider is specified below. In general, in particular if U were defined on R + , one might need to take A which depends on (ξ, t). Note that our definition of robust forward criteria does not require the existence of optimal investment strategies. In that aspect, we follow the approach in [69] rather than the original definition in [52, 53] . This is particularly helpful for the duality theory developed in Section 3.
Example 2.6 An example of a robust forward criterion of Definition 2.5 is given by the pair (U, γ) considered in Proposition 2.2. The pair (U, γ) considered in Proposition 2.1 is an example corresponding to an analogous definition but for the case of random fields defined on R + . We discuss further examples below, in particular in Section 5.
The optimisation in (2.12) fits within the robust EUM paradigm, as discussed in the Introduction. The crucial difference is that we require (2.12) to hold for all pairs t ≤ T . We refer to (2.12) as the dynamic consistency property of (U, γ). In absence of model ambiguity, (2.12) provides a direct extension of the notion of self-generating utility fields studied in [69] and, consequently, of the notion of forward performance criteria, see the Introduction and Section 5.
To relate (2.12) to the more classical dynamic programming principle it is useful to introduce the family of classical value functions {u(·; t, T ) :
This then implies a familiar DPP (or martingale optimality principle):
The setting of (2.13) corresponds to a very general robust EUM but we note that it also has its limitations. For example, the penalty associated to a given measure, γ t,T (Q), is fixed and independent of wealth. This has important implications for the time consistency of optimal investment strategies. Indeed, as we show in Proposition 4.3, when (γ t,T ) are dynamically consistent, and if we have saddle points (π t,T , Q t,T ) solving (2.13), then Q t,r = Q t,T | Fr , t ≤ r ≤ T , and also the optimal investment strategies are time consistent. However, in all generality, we could have (dynamically consistent) robust forward criteria which lead to time inconsistent optimal strategies. An example is given in Section 4. Independence of γ t,T (Q) from investor's wealth is also contrary to the empirical evidence, as discussed in behavioural finance, see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky [35] , which points to the importance of investor's reference point for judging scenarios. In consequence, we believe it might be interesting to study generalisations of the problem in (2.13) . Within the framework of robust EUM, these are possible using quasi-concave utility functionals introduced in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [11] . Their use for (classical) optimal investment problem has been recently investigated by Källblad [37] .
Dual characterization of robust forward criteria
Dual methods have proved useful for the study of optimal investment problems. Although the main focus here is on the evolution of the preferences themselves rather than on the optimal strategy, this still applies. Specifically, the dual problem amounts to the search for an infimum whereas the primal problem features a saddle point. In consequence, the robust forward criteria are easier to characterize in the dual rather than the primal domain. The aim of this section is to establish equivalence of dynamic consistency in the primal and dual domains.
We focus on utility random fields which are finite on the entire real line. The reasons are twofold. First, we complement the work of Schied [62] where only utilities defined on the positive half-line were studied. Second, this simplifies certain technical aspects, see e.g. [27] , and allows us to focus on the novelty of our setting. We note that allowing for negative wealth usually complicates the choice of an appropriate set of admissible strategies yielding the existence of an optimizer, cf. [58, 61] . This is not a concern for us since we do not require the existence of a primal optimiser and hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict to the set of bounded wealth processes 5 . Accordingly, we set in Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 A = A bd , the set of all portfolios producing bounded wealth processes. Specifically, A bd =Ā ∩ (−Ā), whereĀ is the set of all admissible portfolio processes for which, for any T > 0, there exists a constant c > 0 such that X π t ≥ −c, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , a.s. For a given utility random field U , the associated dual random field V :
The notion of dynamic consistency in the dual domain is then naturally defined as follows.
, consisting of a dual random field and a family of penalty functions, is dynamically consistent (or self-generating) if for all
For later use we also introduce the dual value field. Specifically, for
It follows that a pair (V, γ), consisting of a dual random field and a family of penalty functions, is dynamically consistent if for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞, and all
Equivalence between primal and dual dynamic consistency
We first introduce the following technical assumption: 5 Indeed, the utility field defined on the entire real line does not possess any singularities (cf. Assumption 2 below). The value field defined with respect to a more general (but feasible) set of admissible strategies would therefore coincide with the one defined with respect to bounded strategies. Definition 2.5 would still apply, since the notion of robust forward criteria is a consistency requirement placed on the preferences themselves, without a reference to an optimal strategy. In consequence, for utility fields defined on the entire real line, robust forward criteria may be studied and characterized without exactly specifying the domain of optimization; see also Remark 3.8 in [69] . We note also that, since the preferences are stochastic, the exact specification of a feasible set of admissible, but not necessarily bounded, strategies would be highly involved.
Assumption 2 For each T > 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the set Q t,T is convex and weakly compact and the set
4)
satisfies the non-singularity condition in Definition 3.3 in [69] .
Assumption 2 implies that U (x, t) itself satisfies the non-singularity condition. For further discussion of this concept, we refer to Remark 3.4 in [69] . Given that the set Q t,T is weakly compact, a sufficient condition for Assumption 2 to hold, is that U (x, t) is (x, ω)-uniformly bounded from below by a deterministic utility function. Then, it also trivially holds that any family of penalty functions is admissible. Due to convexity, weak compactness of Q t,T is equivalent to closedness in L 0 (cf. Lemma 3.2 in [63] ).
Next, we present the first main result, which yields the conjugacy relations between the functions u(x; t, T ) and v(y; t, T ). We stress that even for t = 0, Theorem 3.2 differs from Theorem 2.4 in [62] in that U (·, T ) is defined on the entire real line and allowed to be stochastic, and moreover we do not impose any finiteness assumptions. The proof is reported in Section 6.1.
Theorem 3.2 Let U (x, t), t ≥ 0, be a utility random field, γ t,T an admissible family of penalty functions and V (y, t) the associated dual random field. Assume that Assumption 2 holds.
Then In consequence, the combination of a utility random field U (x, t) and a family of penalty functions γ t,T is dynamically consistent, if and only if, the combination of the dual random field V (y, t) and γ t,T is dynamically consistent.
Similarly to the non-robust case, see [69] , the dual problem admits a solution even though the primal problem may not as we restricted to using bounded wealth strategies. Proposition 3.3 Let (U, γ) be a utility random field and a family of penalty functions for which Assumption 2 holds. Let (V, γ) be the corresponding dual pair given by (3.1). Then, for each η ∈ L 0 + and t ≤ T < ∞, there exist Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T attaining the infimum in (3.2). We provide the proof in Section 6.1, but remark that the fact that the second component of the optimizer lies in M a T (as opposed to a larger set of finitely additive measures) is a consequence of the utility function being finite on the entire real line (see [69] and also [6, 61] ).
We assumed above that the set of measures Q t,T , defined in (2.11), is weakly compact. Replacing the set Q t,T in the definition of u(·; t, T ) by the set Q a t,T of absolutely continuous measures for which the penalty is finite a.s., Theorem 3.2 still holds under the assumption that Q a t,T is weakly compact. This holds, for example, for all penalty functions associated with coherent risk measures continuous from below; see also the closing remarks in Section 4. In order to genuinely extend to absolutely continuous measures and allow for Q a t,T in the definition of v(·; t, T ), one would need to extend the definition of Z Q V (η/Z Q ) to the null-sets of Q in a suitable way (preserving lower semicontinuity), analogously to the case of utility functions defined on R + in [62] . Such an extension would enable proving Proposition 3.3 using the weak compactness of the level sets rather than of Q a t,T , an assumption which holds for all penalty functions associated with convex risk measures continuous from below. However, at present, we do not know how to carry out such an extensions and, more importantly, how to then prove the conjugacy relations (3.5) and (3.6) relying on compactness of the level sets rather than of Q a t,T .
Dynamic consistency of penalty functions and time consistency of the optimal investment strategies
The definition of robust forward criteria requires the combined criterion consisting of U (x, t) and γ(·) to be dynamically consistent (cf. Definition 2.5).
In this section we further investigate this assumption and relate it to the dynamic consistency of the penalty functions and the time consistency optimal investment strategies. The corresponding proofs are reported in Section 6.2.
Assumption 3 For any T > 0 and Q ∼ P| F T , the family of penalty functions
For any penalty function satisfying (4.1), Q t,T ⊆Q t,T . However, in general, stability under pasting (4.2) may fail. It may be recovered if different definitions of Q t,T are used, e.g. with measures satisfying E[γ t,T (Q)] < ∞, see the remarks below on penalty functions associated with risk measures.
The additional structure resulting from Assumption 3 allows us to consider the question of whether, for a fixed T > 0, the value field u(x, t; T ) associated with a general utility field satisfies itself the Dynamic Programming Principle for t ≤ T as in (2.14) . We show that, under suitable assumptions on the penalty function, this is the case. For particular choices of preferences, this property was used to address the ambiguity averse problem by stochastic control methods in [31, 32, 50] . The proof proceeds by first establishing appropriate consistency in the dual domain and then applying Theorem 3.2. 
For the case of standard (non-robust) utility maximization and deterministic utility functions, it is well known that the value process satisfies the DPP; also referred to as the martingale optimality principle, see [20] . Proposition 4.1 shows that a similar consistency property holds for certain ambiguity averse criteria. However, the value field associated with a general penalty function may fail to be dynamically consistent, see [62] for counterexamples. Hence, while standard forward performance criteria might be viewed as a generalisation, to all times t ≥ 0, of value functions associated with stochastic utility functions, in the robust setting our Definition 2.5 enforces additional structure by imposing the dynamic consistency requirement (2.12) on the pair (U, γ). In general, this is weaker than the assumption of dynamic consistency of γ. Indeed, as illustrated by the next example, there are dynamically consistent pairs (U, γ) where the penalty function γ itself is not dynamically consistent. Such robust forward criteria may lead to time inconsistent optimal investment strategies.
Example 4.2
We work in the setting of Section 2.1. We setλ ≡ 0 and fix a family of bounded random variables (λ t,T ) with 0 ≤ t ≤ T , with each λ t,T being F t -measurable and (λ t,T ) 2 ≤ K, for some K > 0. In turn, let
otherwise. 
We easily conclude that (U, γ) is a robust forward criterion and that dynamic consistency holds. Meanwhile, the resulting optimal strategy, at time t when investing for the horizon [t, T ], isπ t,T u = λ t,T σt Xπ t,T u , t ≤ u ≤ T . Even when considering classical robust portfolio optimisation on [0, T ] these may be time inconsistent since we may have λ t,T σu = λ u,T σu for t ≤ u ≤ T . In our context of forward criteria, when T is not fixed, the "optimal strategy" might be further horizon-inconsistent in the sense that we may haveπ t,T t =π t,T1 t for t ≤ T < T 1 . Hence, the "optimal strategy" is not really a well defined concept since it may depend not only on when we make the decision but also on which horizon we want to consider. This due to fundamental inconsistencies in the beliefs about feasible market models and violation of (4.1).
Observe that in this example property (4.1) is violated in a rather simplistic way. Indeed, at any time t, looking to invest on [t, T ], the investor believes that only one model is feasible. This is a degenerate case since the choice of this model changes arbitrary with t and T and there is no consistency requirement. Consider, for example, the extreme situation when all λ t,T are constant and T is fixed. Then, at time zero, the investor picks possibly different models which she will choose to believe in when making investment decisions at t for horizon [t, T ]. It is not surprising that this might lead to time inconsistent investment strategies. However the flexibility of fixing the penalty γ t,T means that the dynamic consistency of the value functions, (2.14) on [0, T ], or (2.12) in general, may be preserved.
In Example 4.2, lack of time consistency of optimal strategies is inherited from lack of dynamic consistency of the penalty functions, i.e. from violation of (4.1). In contrast, when the penalty functions are consistent, we recover the time consistency of the optimisers. Furthermore, for x > 0, there exists a processπ t , t ≥ 0, and a positive martingale Y t , t ≥ 0, such that, for all 0 ≤ t < T < ∞, u(x + t 0π s dS s ; t, T ) is attained for π t,T =π and Q t,
The above result, combined with Example 4.2, shows that the dynamic consistency of penalty functions (4.1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for time consistency of optimal investment strategies. This applies both to the robust forward criteria studied here as well as to the classical robust expected utility maximisation on a fixed horizon. It leads to interesting open questions. First, the economic and empirical justification for (4.1) remains unclear. In fact, it is a non-trivial requirement and, for example, penalty functions associated to convex risk measures do not, in general, satisfy (4.1); see also Remark 3.5 in Schied [62] . Second, what are the generalisations of the optimisation problem in (2.13) which would preserve time consistency of optimal strategies while (4.1) is violated?
Next, we show that the dynamic consistency property of penalty functions leads to a characterization of robust forward criteria in terms of a certain "weighted submartingale" property of the dual field. This will be used to derive an equation allowing us to investigate particular classes and examples of robust forward criteria. Proposition 4.4 Let U (x, t) be a utility random field and γ t,T an admissible family of penalty functions such that Assumption 2 holds. In addition, assume either that Assumption 3 holds, or that (4.1) holds and, for all T > 0, U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 (F T , Q) for all Q ∈Q 0,T . Let V (y, t) be the dual field given in (3.1). Then, the following two statements are equivalent: i) (U, γ) is a robust forward criterion; ii) For each y > 0 and all t ≤ T < ∞, the inequality
5)
holds for all Z ∈ Z a T and Q ∈ Q t,T . Furthermore, there exists Z ∈ Z a and a positive martingale Y t , t ≥ 0, such that, for all t ≤ T < ∞, Q T ∈ Q 0,T , with dQ T dP| F T = Y T , and (4.5) holds as equality for Z T and Q T .
We conclude this section with brief remarks on penalty functions γ t,T associated with convex risk measures (see [28, 46] and [26] ). Such penalty functions satisfy properties i) -iv) of Definition 2.4 but not necessarily the weak compactness condition in Assumption 2. However the latter may be recovered under suitable further conditions. To wit, recall that the level sets of convex risk measures (continuous from below) are weakly compact (see Lemma 4.1 in [62] ). In particular, our compactness assumption is satisfied by any coherent risk measure which only assigns finite penalty to equivalent measures, see [31] for an example. Regarding Assumption 3, time consistency of convex risk measures is characterized by property (4.1) and any time consistent coherent risk measure 6 admits the pasting property (4.2) (cf. Corollary 1.26 in [1] ). However, in general, (4.1) does not imply (4.2). Nevertheless, any convex risk measure admits a robust representation where Q t,T is replaced by the set {Q ∼ P| F T : E[γ t,T (Q)] < ∞}, which in turn satisfies (4.2). This property is crucial to proving the equivalence between time consistency of the risk measure and property (4.1) (see, e.g. Theorem 17 in [1] or [8] ). Assuming (4.2) is therefore consistent with the use of time consistent penalty functions associated with risk measures.
The structure of robust forward criteria and representative cases
In this section we study the structure of robust forward criteria and subsequently discuss specific cases. Throughout, we assume the Brownian setup of Section 2.1 and the discussion is mostly formal. We start with the structure of forward criteria and focus on the non-uniqueness of robust forward criteria for given initial preferences. Then, we study examples of classes where the uniqueness may be recovered. These classes are obtained by generalising, in a particular manner, the main example studied in Section 2.1. First, in Section 5.2, we consider fields which exhibit logarithmic dependence on wealth. Then, in Section 5.3, we focus on robust forward criteria with no volatility (cf. (5.6) below). Such criteria are characterised by a specific evolutionary property and linked to a certain PDE (equation (5.7) below). For both examples, the discussion is in terms of dual fields. Finally, in Section 5.4, we show that for each robust forward criterion there exists a (standard) forward criterion, in the fixed reference market producing the same optimal behaviour.
The structure and non-uniqueness of robust forward criteria
In the standard, model-specific setting, the forward performance criteria of Musiela and Zariphopoulou [52, 53] are not uniquely specified from the initial condition. This is due to the flexibility of the investor to choose the volatility of her criterion. Indeed, recall that a (standard) forward performance criterion (admitting an Itô decomposition) satisfies the SPDE
equipped with an initial condition, say U (x, 0) = u 0 (x). Similarly, the value process in the classical EUM problem satisfies (under appropriate regularity conditions) the SPDE (5.1) on the interval [0, T ). However the equation is then equipped with a terminal condition U (x, T ) = U (x) and constitutes a backward SPDE; see e.g. [47] . For a given terminal condition U (x), when recovering the value process from this backward SPDE, the (unique) solution consists of the pair (U (x, t), a(x, t)) which are both simultaneously obtained. Due to the volatility component a(x, t), there might however exist multiple stochastic terminal conditions, for all of which U (·, 0) coincide. Put differently, for a given initial condition u 0 (x), the forward SPDE (5.1) might have multiple solutions which are catalogued by their volatility a(x, t). In the forward approach it is then down to the investor herself to specify this volatility. Similarly in the robust setting, even with a fixed penalty function, in order to specify robust forward criteria uniquely, we expect to impose further constraints. These could be either on the form of the primal/dual field or on the choice of volatility structure. We discuss both below. From the financial perspective, compared with classical utility maximization, the forward formulation considers different inputs to the investment problem; this for the standard as well as the robust case. In the classical setup, the investor's preferences are fully characterized via the spatial behaviour of the utility function at a future date and the rest is derived. In the forward setting, the initial condition u 0 (x) along with a requirement of dynamic consistency are a-priori fixed. The former might serve as a proxy for the investor's prior investments and the latter formalise the aim to invest in a manner which is consistent therewith. In order to pin down a unique investment preference, the investor needs to then specify additional evolutionary properties of the utility field.
Class of logarithmic robust forward criteria
We start by preserving the logarithmic dependence on wealth seen in the main motivating example in Section 2.1. For this, we consider non-negative wealth and, since our main results were obtained for utility fields defined on the whole line, the discussion is formal. A direct computation shows that, up to a constant shift, the dual field to U given in (2.5 
We are interested if one could obtain similar fields but with non-zero quadratic variation. Namely, we assume that V (y, t) admits the representation
for some processes b t and a t which do not depend on y. Further, we assign to the measure Q η (cf. (2.2) ) the penalty 7
, such that g t (·) is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous, and moreover satisfies the coercivity condition, g t (η) ≥ −a + b|η| 2 for some constants a and b (cf. (8.6) in [26] ). For example, the choice of g t (η) = |η| 2 for |η| ≤ g, and g t (η) = ∞ otherwise, ensures that γ t,T satisfies 8 both Assumptions 2 and 3, while a different quadratic penalty was considered in (2.3). We let Q = ∩ T >0 Q 0,T . We assume that (λ t ) is in P and let Z ν t = E − λ s dŴ 1 s − ν s dŴ 2 s t , for ν ∈ P. Note that Z e = {Z ν : ν ∈ P and Z ν t is a P-martingale on [0, ∞)}. In particular, the assumption of NFLVR on finite horizons, implies that Z ν ∈ Z e for ν t ≡ 0. According to Lemma 6.6 below, in order for the pair (V, γ) to satisfy (3.2), it suffices 9 that for all Z ν ∈ Z e and Q η ∈ Q, the process
is a Q η -submartingale, and that there exist ν * and η * for which it is a martingale. We recall that Q η is given by dQ η dP |F t = D η t , with D η t specified in (2.2) . A straightforward application of Itô-Ventzell's formula and formal minimization over ν t , yields that in order for M ην t to satisfy this condition, the processes a t and b t must satisfy the relation:
We then see that for a given initial condition and a fixed penalty g t (·), specifying the volatility process a t typically leads to a unique robust forward criterion, for the drift is then given via (5.5) . In particular, for a t ≡ 0 and g t (η) = δ t |η| 2 /2, we recover b t = − 1 2 δt 1+δtλ 2 t , as required. Another approach to pin down a unique U might be to consider fields which are Markovian. For example, within a (Markovian) stochastic factor model, we could require that U is represented as a deterministic function of the underlying factors. This function must then solve a specific equation, closely related to the HJB equation associated with the classical value function within the same factor model. However, in the forward setting, the equation has to be solved forward in time and is therefore ill-posed. We refer to [54] for a study of such criteria in a model-specific setup.
Class of robust forward criteria with zero volatility
In the previous section, we extended the example of Section 2.1 by adding a volatility term -the stochastic integral in (5.2) -to the representation of the primal (or dual) field. Here, we generalise in a different direction: we keep zero volatility but drop the specific (logarithmic) dependence on wealth. We consider the case of utility field defined on R and, specifically, consider the class of criteria for which the volatility of the dual field is identically zero:
dV (y, t) = V t (y, t)dt, t ≥ 0.
(5.6)
We will refer to this class as non-volatile, or time-monotone, criteria. For standard forward criteria, this additional assumption specifies an interesting class of preferences; we refer the reader to [7, 52] for further details. Similarly as in the example in Section 5.2, a straightforward application of Itô-Ventzell's formula and formal minimization over ν t , yields that in order for M ην t (cf. (5.4)) to be a submartingale for each choice of ν and η, and a martingale at optimum, the random convex function V (y, t) must solve the equation
This is a random PDE, as opposed to the SPDE we obtained before. Note that (5.7) implies that non-volatile criteria are, in fact, monotone in time which justifies the terminology. We studied an instance of this equation in Section 2.1 where the criterion (2.5) is logarithmic as well as non-volatile, and its appropriate form could, formally, be obtained by substituting the dual Ansatz V (y, t) = − ln y + t 0 b s ds into either of equations (5.5) or (5.7). Equation (5.7) might be viewed as a (dual) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In particular, a verification theorem stating that every well-behaved (convex) solution to (5.7) constitutes a robust forward criterion might be proven. However, to prove existence or explicitly solve this equation is hard. In order to illustrate this, consider the case of no model-uncertainty, which corresponds to g t (η) = ∞, η = 0. Then, equation (5.7) reduces to the random equation This equation characterizes standard non-volatile criteria in a model with market price of risk (λ t ). Equation (5.8), see [7, 52] , is closely related to the (illposed) backward heat equation whose solutions only exist for a specific class of initial conditions, as characterised by Widder's theorem. We easily see that Equation (5.7) inherits difficulties related to the equation being ill-posed, but in addition it is fully non-linear. Moreover, we also need to ensure that its solution is adapted.
Equivalent standard (non-robust) forward criteria
We conclude with some remarks on the existence of equivalent forward criteria within a non-robust setting. First, returning to the example in Section 2.1, observe that the optimal strategyπ in (2.4) can also be interpreted as the Kelly strategy associated with an auxiliary market with market price of risk λ t :=λ t +η 1 t = δt 1+δtλ t , t ≥ 0, which can be interpret as the market price of riskλ the investor considers most likely, adjusted by the investor's trust in that estimation. This is an instance of a general phenomenon related to the existence of a saddle point (π,η). Indeed, if a saddle point exists for all t ≤ T , a robust forward criterion (U, γ) with penalty function given by (5.3) produces the same investment strategies as the standard forward criterioñ U (x, t) := U (x, t) + t 0 g s (η s )ds, (5.9) specified in a fictitious market with market price of riskλ t =λ t +η 1 t , t ≥ 0. In turn, an application of Bayes' rule implies that the optimal strategy associated with the criterion (5.9) is also optimal for a forward criterion specified in the reference market; namely,
(5.10)
Note that if U (x, t) is a non-volatile criterion, then Dη tŨ (x, t) is in general volatile (cf. Theorem 4 in [51] for examples).
For the class of robust forward criteria for which the above formalism can be made rigorous, the following holds: if the robust forward criterion admits an optimal strategy, then that strategy is optimal also for a specific standard (non-robust) forward criterion viewed in the reference market. Naturally, the latter criterion is defined in terms of the optimalη t , which is part of the solution to the robust problem and not a priori known. Nevertheless, on a more abstract level, this implies that viewed as a class of preference criteria, forward criteria can be argued to be 'closed' under the introduction of a certain type of model uncertainty. For a similar conclusion in terms of the use of different numeraires, see Theorem 2.5 in [22] or Section 5.1 in [21] . An analogue result was first shown for stochastic differential utilities in [67] . In both cases, the results are possible since the notions are general enough to allow for stochastic preferences.
The advantage of properly formulating a robust forward criteria is to disentangle the impact of the preferences originating, respectively, from risk and model-ambiguity, see Section 2.1. In consequence, the inverse question to the above observations appears of great interest: under what conditions a given (volatile non-robust) forward criterion can be written as a non-volatile robust forward criterion with respect to some non-trivial penalty function? Finally, we also remark that the analysis herein and, thus, the above discussion, is restricted to measures equivalent to P. Considering absolutely continuous measures introduces further complexity (cf. [62] for the static case) but should not alter the main conclusions; see also remarks in Section 3.1. In contrast, considering a larger set of possibly mutually singular measures would require new insights, see [17, 56] . We start by introducing relevant notation from Zitković [69] since we then apply the duality therein in our proofs, see (6.5) below. Then, in Section 6.1.1, we prove conjugacy relations and existence of a dual optimizer for a specific auxiliary F 0 -measurable problem. In Section 6.1.2, Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 are proven via a reduction to the auxiliary problem.
Let 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞ and κ a random variable in L ∞ + (F t ). We will typically consider κ = 1 1 A , A ∈ F t , and use it to localise arguments to a set. We also use the notation Z t,T ∈ Z a T and Z ∈ Q t,T to denote, respectively, an element in {Z t,T : Z ∈ Z a T } and {Z Q : Q ∈ Q t,T }. The L p -spaces, p ∈ [0, ∞], are defined with respect to (Ω, F T , P |F T ). Let K t,T := T t π s dS s : π ∈ A bd and C t,T := K t,T − L 0 + ∩ L ∞ . The optimization over K t,T in (2.13) might then be replaced by optimization over C t,T . For Q ∈ Q t,T , we introduce the function
Next, let D t,T := ζ * ∈ (L ∞ ) * : ζ * , ζ ≤ 0 for all ζ ∈ C t,T and, for η ∈ L 1 + (F t ), let D η t,T := ζ * ∈ D t,T : ζ * , ξ = η, ξ , for all ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ) . Recall that according to Lemma A.4 in [69] , ζ * ∈ D t,T ∩ L 1 + if and only if ζ * = ηZ t,T , (6.1)
for some η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) and Z t,T ∈ Z a T . Note that the proof of this result uses that the market satisfies NFLVR on finite horizons. We also define the function
otherwise; (6.2) and the function v Q κ :
Finally, we introduce auxiliary value functions u κ :
Results for the auxiliary value functions u κ and v κ
We establish in this section results for the F 0 -measurable value functions u κ and v κ introduced above. First, we consider the existence of a dual optimizer.
Moreover, the function v κ (η) is convex and lower semicontinuous with respect to the weak topology.
Hence, let (ζ * n , Q n ) ∈ D η t,T × Q t,T , a sequence such that
Since Q t,T is weakly compact, there is a subsequence (ζ * n , Q n ) such that Q n converges a.s. to someQ ∈ Q t,T . From the Banach-Alaouglu theorem, we have that D t,T is weak * -compact. Hence, there exists a (further) subsequence such that ζ * n converges in the weak * -topology to someζ * ∈ D t,T . Since, for any ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), ζ * , ξ = lim n→∞ ζ * n , ξ = η, ξ , we have thatζ * ∈ D η t,T . Next, according to Definition 2.4, the mapping Q → E [κγ t,T (Q)] is l.s.c. with respect to a.s. convergence. In order to argue that v κ (η) is attained for (ζ * ,Q), it therefore only remains to argue joint lower semicontinuity of the mapping (ζ * , Q) → V Q κ (ζ * ). Due to Assumption 2, Proposition A.3 in [69] may be applied to the (auxiliary) utility fieldŨ (
T is uniformly integrable due to Assumption 2. Application of Fatou's Lemma to the corresponding positive part then yields lower semicontinuity, with respect to a.s. convergence, of the first term in (6.3) as a function of Q ∈ Q t,T . The second term is continuous in ζ * with respect to weak * -convergence. Since the pointwise supremum preserves lower semicontinuity, this allows us to conclude the joint lower semicontinuity of the mapping (ζ * , Q) → V Q κ (ζ * ) with respect to the product topology on D η t,T × Q t,T . The convexity of v κ (η) follows immediately from the joint convexity of the mapping (ζ * , Q) → V Q κ (ζ * )+E [κγ t,T (Q)] (cf. (6.3)). In order to argue the lower semicontinuity of v κ (η), let η α ∈ L 1 + be a sequence such that η α → η weakly and let (ζ * α ,
. By use of the same arguments as above, one obtains a subsequence (ζ * α , Q α ) converging in the product topology to some (ζ * , Q)
, then yields the lower semicontinuity of v κ (η).
In order to establish the conjugacy relations for u κ and v κ , we first recall a result from [69] . To this end, let Q ∈ Q t,T , κ ∈ L ∞ + (F t ) and U (x, t) such thatŨ (x, T ), defined in (3.4) , satisfies the non-singularity condition in Definition 3.3 in [69] , andŨ (x, T ) ∈ L 1 , x ∈ R. Note that on {κ > 0}, V (y, T ) = Z Q t,T V y/Z Q t,T , T . Application of Propositions A1 and A3 in [69] to the (auxiliary) stochastic utility function 10Ũ (x, T ), x ∈ R, then yields
According to (6.1), for each ζ * ∈ D t,T ∩ L 1 + , there exists η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) such that ζ * ∈ D η t,T . Combined with the definitions of V Q κ and v Q κ , (6.4) therefore implies 10 Note that although Z Q t,T U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 , it is not a priori clear whether Z Q t,s U (s, x) ∈ L 1 (Fs), for t < s < T . Hence, it is not clear whether the associated random field is actually a utility field in the sense of Definition 2.3 (the field could easily be adjusted in order for the utility and path regularity conditions to hold). However, Proposition A1 in [69] only makes use of the slice U (x, T ) and can therefore be applied under the given assumptions.
We also establish an auxiliary Lemma. To this end, for ξ, κ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), Q ∈ Q t,T and g ∈ C t,T , let
Lemma 6.2 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and let ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), κ ∈ L ∞ (F t ) and g ∈ C t,T . Then, the mapping Q → E[J κ,ξ (Q, g)] is weakly lowersemicontinuous on the convex and weakly compact set Q t,T .
Proof Recall that there exists c > 0 such that ξ + g ≥ −c, a.s. Moreover, We now establish the conjugacy relations between u κ and v κ . This result is the cornerstone in the proof of the conditional versions in Theorem 3.2 below. As in previous works, see [59, 62, 63] , we use a minimax theorem in order to reformulate the robust problem as the infimum over a class of non-robust criteria. We then apply duality to each of the inner maximization problems. Unlike Schied [62] , who used EUM duality results of Kramkov and Schachermayer [44] , we apply relation (6.5) to suitably defined (stochastic) utility fields considered under the fixed reference measure. This is of technical as well as conceptual importance and makes key use of Assumption 2. Proposition 6.3 Suppose (U, γ) satisfy Assumption 2. Then, for all ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ) and η ∈ L 1 + (F t ), it holds that
Proof Since, for each Z ∈ Q t,T , g → E[κZU (ξ+g)] is concave on the convex set C t,T , according to Lemma 6.2 we might apply the lopsided minimax theorem (cf. Chapter 6 in [3] ) to obtain
where the last equality follows directly from the definition of u Q κ . Note that due to concavity, if U (x 0 , T ) ∈ L 1 for some x 0 ∈ R, then U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 for all x ∈ R. Since P ∈ Q t,T and U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 due to assumption, we can then, w.l.o.g., replace the set Q t,T in (6.7) by
Next, according to Assumption 2, for all Q ∈ Q κ t,T , it holds thatŨ (x, T ) defined in (3.4) satisfies the non-singularity condition in Definition 3.3 in [69] , and thatŨ (x, T ) ∈ L 1 , x ∈ R. Then, the conjugacy relation (6.5) yields
where it remains to argue the last step. To this end, note that for each ζ * ∈
Hence, Q κ t,T can be replaced by Q t,T without loss of generality. This completes the proof of the first conjugacy relation. To argue that v κ is the convex conjugate of u κ it suffices to argue that v κ is convex and weakly lower semicontinuous, which follows from Proposition 6.1.
Proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3
We are now ready to prove the main results of Section 3.1. Our setting is dynamic, which in this generality appears novel even in the context of the classical robust EUM, compare e.g. Schied [62] . In consequence, we need to reduce the conditional formulations to the F 0 -measurable case. This is done with the help of the following auxiliary lemma which uses crucially condition (iv) from Definition 2.4 of penalty functions. Recall from (6.6) the definition of J κ,ξ (Q, g), Q ∈ Q, g ∈ C t,T .
Proof
The inequality '≤' is trivial. To show the reverse inequality, let J(Q) := J κ,ξ (Q, g), Q ∈ Q t,T . It suffices to argue that the set J(Q) : Q ∈ Q t,T is downwards directed. Indeed, according to Neveu [55] , there then exists a sequence Q n ∈ Q t,T such that J(Q n ) is decreasing and ess inf Q∈Q t,T J(Q) = lim n→∞ J(Q n ). The result then follows by use of the monotone convergence theorem. To this end, let Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Q t,T and define a set A := {J(Q 1 ) ≤ J(Q 2 )} ∈ F t . Further, let the measureQ be given by dQ dP :
Hence,Q ∈ Q t,T and J(Q) = min{J(Q 1 ), J(Q 2 )}, a.s. In consequence, J(Q) :
Q ∈ Q t,T is closed under minimization and, thus, downwards directed.
First, we establish the existence of a dual optimizer.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Recall that η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) is fixed. Further, according to Proposition 6.1, for any κ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), v κ (η) is attained for some pair (ζ * ,Q) ∈ D η t,T × Q t,T . Observe that if v κ (η) < ∞, then VQ κ (ζ * ) < ∞, and it follows from (6.2) thatζ * ∈ L 1 + . Thereforeζ * ∈ D η t,T ∩ L 1 + and according to (6.1), there existsZ ∈ Z a T such thatζ * = ηZ t,T . We now argue that for κ := (max{1, v(η; t, T }) −1 ∈ L ∞ (F t ), the thus defined pair (Z t,T ,Q) attains the essential infimum in (3.2) . First, note that κ ∈ [0, 1] and, w.l.o.g., we may assume that {κ > 0} = ∅. Further, by definition, v κ (η) < ∞. Hence, the above pair (Z t,T ,Q) is well-defined. Next, suppose contrary to the claim that there exist ε > 0, Q ∈ Q t,T , Z t,T ∈ Z a T and a set B ∈ F t with P(B) > 0, such that on B, 
which contradicts the choice of (ζ * ,Q) as the minimizer.
We now turn to Theorem 3.2. We argue by contradiction; assuming that the conditional conjugacy relations does not hold, taking expectations and applying Proposition 6.3 and Lemma 6.4 yields a contradiction which allows us to conclude.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 First, we consider assertion (3.5) . In order to verify that the (weak) inequality '≤' holds, note that we trivially have the inequality
Since E Q [g] ≤ 0, for all Q ∈ M a T , g ∈ C t,T , and U (x, T ) ≤ V (y, T ) + xy, for all x ∈ R, y ≥ 0, it follows immediately from (6.9) that, for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ),
To prove the reverse inequality, we argue by contradiction and assume that there exist ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), ε > 0 and A ∈ F t such that ess inf
Observe that u(ξ; t, T ) < ∞ a.s. on A and, w.l.o.g., we may assume that there is M < ∞ such that u(ξ; t, T ) ≤ M a.s. on A. Multiplying the latter inequality by κ = 1 1 A , taking expectations on both sides and applying Lemma 6.4, we then obtain
where the expression in the first expectation on the right hand side is defined to be zero on A c . According to (6.1), we have that for every ζ * ∈ D η t,T ∩ L 1 + with η ∈ L 1 + (F t ), there exists Z t,T ∈ Z a T such that ζ * = ηZ t,T . Using this and taking the supremum over g ∈ K t,T , we deduce that
for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) such that η = η1 1 A , Q ∈ Q t,T and ζ * ∈ D η t,T ∩L 1 + . Therefore, for any η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) and Q ∈ Q t,T , the above inequality holds for all ζ * ∈ D η t,T . Indeed, if ζ * / ∈ L 1 + or η = η1 1 A , then it holds that V Q κ (ζ * ) = ∞ (cf. (6.2)). Hence, u κ (ξ) + εP (A) ≤ v Q κ (η) + E [κγ t,T (Q)] + ξ, η , for all η ∈ L 1 + (F t ) and Q ∈ Q t,T and. In turn, since u κ (ξ) ≤ M < ∞ due to the above choice of κ, we obtain
and according to Proposition 6.3, this yields the required contradiction.
Next, we turn to relation (3.6) . Note that assertion (3.5) implies that for all η ∈ L 1 (F t ) and ξ ∈ L ∞ (F t ), v(η; t, T ) ≥ u(ξ; t, T ) − ξη. Hence, the inequality "≥" follows directly. The reverse inequality follows by similar arguments as above; specifically, by arguing by contradiction and then applying Lemma 6.4 and Proposition 6.3.
Proofs of Propositions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4
In order to prove the results in Section 4, we first establish two lemmas. Lemma 6.5 Let T > 0 and let V be a dual random field and γ an admissible family of penalty functions such that either Assumption 3 holds, or (4.1) holds and v − (ζ; t, T ) ∈ L 1 (F t ; Q) for all ζ ∈ L 0 (F t ) and Q ∈Q 0,T , t ≤ T . Then, the pair (v, γ), where v(·; t, T ) is the dual value field, satisfies (3.2) on [0, T ].
Proof Fix 0 ≤ s < t < T < ∞. For Q ∈ Q 0,T , we use the convention γ 0,t (Q) = γ 0,t (Q |Ft ). Let Z ∈ Z a t and Q ∈ Q s,t . Using Proposition 3.3, we denote by Z * ∈ Z a T and Q * ∈ Q t,T the optimal elements for which v ηZ s,t /Z Q s,t ; t, T is attained. Then, it holds that
where it was used that Z t Z * t,T ∈ Z a T and thatQ ∈ Q s,T , with dQ
T . Indeed, (4.2) yields immediately thatQ ∈ Q s,T . For the case when (4.1) holds and v − (ζ; s, T ) ∈ L 1 (F T ;Q), ζ ∈ L 0 (F T ), the fact that v(η; s, t) is finite implies that E Q γ t,T (Q * ) |F s < ∞ and, thus,Q ∈ Q s,T .
Next, let Z ∈ Z a T and Q ∈ Q 0,T be the optimal objects for which the infimum in v(η; s, T ) is attained. Note that due to (4.1), the fact that Q ∈ Q 0,T implies Q ∈ Q t,T and Q |Ft ∈ Q s,t . It follows that v(η; s,
; t, T F s + γ s,t (Q) ≥ v(η; s, T ), (6.11) where the last inequality is due to (6.10). Hence, equality must hold and we easily conclude. Lemma 6.6 Let U (x, t) be a utility random field and let V (y, t) be the corresponding dual field defined in (3.1). Further, let γ t,T be a family of penalty functions satisfying (4.1). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
In order to prove that ii) implies i), it suffices to show that, for any 0 < t < T < ∞ and η ∈ L 0 + (F t ), it holds that V (η, t) ≤ E Q V ηZ t,T /Z Q t,T , T F t + γ t,T (Q), (6.15) for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T and that there exists someQ ∈ Q t,T andẐ ∈ Z a T for which equality holds. Note that (6.12) implies that for a simple, positive and F t -measurable random variableη = n k=1 y k 1 1 A k , we have that
for all Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T . Using a similar argument to the one used in the proof of Theorem 3.14 in [69] , this implies that (6.16) holds for arbitrarỹ η ∈ L 0 + (F t ). For any Q ∈ Q t,T and Z ∈ Z a T , (6.15) is then obtained by letting η = ηZ Q t /Z t . Equality in (6.15) follows by a similar argument where all the inequalities become equalities by the choice of Q T ∈ Q t,T and Z T ∈ Z a T for which (6.12) holds with equality.
Assertion iii) trivially implies ii). Hence, it only remains to show that i) yields iii). To this end, let T 1 < T 2 . Further, let Z 1 ∈ Z a T1 and Q 1 ∈ Q T1 be the optimal arguments for which v(y; 0, T 1 ) is attained; their existence is ensured by Proposition 3.3. In turn, let Q * ∈ Q T2 and Z * ∈ Z T2 be the optimal arguments for which v yZ 1 T1 /Z Q1 T1 ; T 1 , T 2 is attained, and define Q 2 and Z 2 as follows:
T1,T2
and Z 2 = Z 1 T1 Z * T1,T2 .
By use of the same argument as in (6.10) (which makes use of (4.1) and (4.2)) combined with the fact that (V, γ) satisfy (3.2) for t ≤ T < ∞, it follows that Z 2 ∈ Z a T2 , Q 2 ∈ Q 0,T2 and v(y; 0, T 1 ) = E Z Q 1 T1 Z Q * T1,T2 V y
, T 2 + γ 0,T2 Z Q1 T1 Z Q * T1,T2 = E Q 2 V yZ 2 T2 /Z Q 2 T2 , T 2 + γ 0,T2 Q 2 ≥ v(y; 0, T 2 ).
Therefore, equality must hold and, thus, v(y; 0, T 2 ) is attained for Z 2 and Q 2 . As argued above (cf. (6.11)), it follows for any T < T 2 , that v(y; 0, T ) is attained for Z = Z 2 T and Q = Q 2 | F T . Subsequent repetition of the above pasting procedure then yields Z ∈ Z a and a sequence Q T i , i ∈ N, with Q T i = Q T i+1 | F T i and Q T := Q T i | F T ∈ Q 0,T , T i ≥ T , such that for all T > 0, v(y; 0, T ) is attained for Z T and Q T . In turn, by once again using arguments similar to the ones used to show that i) implies ii), we obtain that for any t < T < ∞, (6.12) holds as equality for Z T and Q T . Hence, iii) holds and we conclude.
We now argue that the results in Section 4 follow from the above lemmas. First, Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 6.5 readily yield Proposition 4.1. Further, according to Proposition 3.9 in [69] , the fact that U (x, T ) ∈ L 1 (F T , Q) for all Q ∈Q 0,T , T > 0, implies that assumption b) of Lemma 6.6 holds. Hence, combined with Theorem 3.2, Lemma 6.6 yields Proposition 4.4.
Next, we establish Proposition 4.3. To this end, w.l.o.g., let t = 0 and x ∈ R. Recall that u(·; 0, T ) and v(·; 0, T ) satisfy the conjugacy relations (see Theorem 3.2) and let y * > 0 the value for which the infimum in (3.5) is attained; y * is independent of T since u(x; 0, T ) = U (x, 0), T ≥ 0. By use of the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6.6 (cf. i) implies iii)), it follows that there exist Z ∈ Z a and a positive martingale Y t , t ≥ 0, such that for T ≥ 0, Q T ∈ Q 0,T with dQ T dP| F T := Y T , and v(y * ; 0, T ) is attained for Z T and Q T . Due to the conjugacy relations and the existence of a saddle point, it follows (see e.g. the proof of Theorem 2.6 in [62] ) that which gives the contradiction u(x, 0; T ) < u(x, 0; u). Similarly, assuming the reverse strict inequality in (6.17) also gives a contradiction, and we easily conclude.
Proof of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Fix 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞. Throughout the proof, we writeŴ t =Ŵ 1 t . To alleviate the notation, let L t = t 0λ u dŴ u and M t = t 0λ u 1+δu dŴ u . Recall thatÊ e κ L T < ∞, κ > 1/2. Take p,p > 1 such that Since E Qη ln X π T ≤ E Qη ln Xπ T for any strategy π ∈ A x , we conclude that where the equality follows by a direct computation (see, also, p. 721 in [38] ).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Fix 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞. Note that, by definition, Qη ∈ Q t,T . It suffices to show thatπ ∈ A; that U (Xπ u , u), u ∈ [t, T ], is a submartingale under any Q η ∈ Q t,T ; and that, for any π ∈ A, U (X π u , u), u ∈ [t, T ], is a supermartingale under Qη. W.l.o.g., we let t = 0; we also define λ η s :=λ s + η 1 s and writeŴ t =Ŵ 1 t . First, note that for any strategy π ∈ A, recalling the form of U (x, t) from (2.9) and the wealth-dynamics from (6.18), we have that
where Wη is a BM under Qη. Using the properties imposed on the set of admissible strategies A, we obtain that the Doléans-Dade exponential in the above expression is a martingale under any Q η ∈ Q 0,T . In consequence, for any π ∈ A, the process U (X π · , ·) is a supermartingale on [t, T ] under Qη. Next, recall the form of the strategyπ from (2.8); it is clearly adapted. With the notation L · = · 0λ u dŴ u and M η · = · 0 η u dŴ u , we note that M η T ≤ L T , and thus it follows by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.2 that E η [ T 0 (λη t ) 2 du] ≤ E η [ L T ] < ∞, for any η with Q η ∈ Q 0,T ; in particular, Xπ is thus well defined. Recalling again the form of U (x, t) from (2.9) and the dynamics of the wealth-process from (6.18), we then note that for any η with Q η ∈ Q 0,T , U Xπ t , t = −e −ax E − where W η is a Brownian motion under Q η . Using that 0 ≤ λη t ≤ λ η t , that the Doléans-Dade exponential of a local martingale is again a local martingale, and that any non-positive local martingale is a submartingale, we thus obtain that U (Xπ · , ·) is a submartingale on [t, T ] under any Q η ∈ Q 0,T .
Finally, to verify thatπ is indeed in A, it only remains to argue that E η [e 1 2 T 0 (λη u ) 2 du ] < ∞, for any Q η ∈ Q 0,T . Since · 0 (λη u ) 2 du ≤ L · , it suffices to argue that E η [e 1 2 L T ] < ∞. To this end, recall thatÊ[e 2 L T ] < ∞. With p = q = 2, we then have that
where we used the fact that M η T ≤ L T , the assumed integrability of L T , and the fact that this coupled with Novikov's condition implies that the first expectation equals one.
